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I. INTRODUCTION
Why do some social problems attract more private and public
resources than others? How do we as individual voters and
contributors come to devote our attention and energy to some causes
or experiments over others? One implicit contribution of Martha
Fineman's work is to draw attention to the fact that struggling
families have not been high on our lists of causes.! There is
something of a puzzle in this important lamentation, because there is
a consensus that many of our serious social problems are caused or
exacerbated by impoverished opportunities that might be statistically
linked to poor, single-parent households.2 Fineman's discussion
targets neither poverty nor single-parent status.3 However, it is fair to
say that she draws attention to the sad and frustrating persistence of
an American underclass and that this underclass, is linked in both
* William B. Graham Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.
1. See Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence, Autonomy,
and Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U.J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 13 (2000).
2. See Sheryl L. Howell, How Will Battered Women Fare Under the New Welfare Reform, 12
BERKEL OMEN'S LJ. 140, 141 (1997) (stating that congressional findings in prelude to the
welfare act identifies dilemmas of single family households, and further links them, in a
gendered way, to societal problems).
3. See Fineman, supra note 1, at 18 (stating that caretaking work itself creates a collective
societal debt).
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perception and fact to poverty and family structure.4 If governments
and private endeavors create great universities, build space stations,
and generate fabulous national wealth, then why not some progress
on the home front?5
One puzzle is the contrast between our successes and our failures.
My first step is to frame this puzzle in terms of the range of successes
of political, non-profit, and other entrepreneurs. Most social
problems create opportunities for politicians to attract our votes.6
Many social problems set the stage for private entrepreneurs who see
the potential for profit where they can outperform the public sector
and capture resources that the public is inclined to spend. Social
problems also stimulate the formation of not-for-profit intermediaries
who are able to apply private contributions and sometimes public
funds to social problems.7 The puzzle put forth and explored here is
why the opportunities for entrepreneurial success touched on in the
Fineman lecture does not seem to generate serious activity. Thus, in
the case of the non-profit sector, our daily mail contains many
solicitations that appeal to our concern for so many causes-but so
rarely for programs that might make the plight of relatively poor
families less desperate. In the political arena, politicians do not
compete for our votes by promising to solve these problems or to do
more than has been done in the past and at lower cost. As for profit-
making opportunities, we do not find entrepreneurs advertising or
bidding for serious privatization of social welfare programs.
Professor Fineman indicts our society for its failures, and implores
us to do better.8 My reaction in this Comment is to focus on the
puzzle of why things are as she describes them. I will suggest that
understanding these puzzles about the agendas of public and social
entrepreneurs may be useful in imagining solutions to the tragedies
and disgraces around us.
4. Fineman, supra note 1, at 25.
5. See RIcHARD R NELSON, THE MOON AND THE GHETrO 13-18 (1977) (discussing the
successes and failures of domestic social programs aimed at addressing poverty).
6. See, e.g., Glenn L. Pierce & Michael Radelet, Challenging the Death Penalty: A Colloquium,
The Role and Consequences of the Death Penalty in American Politics, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 711, 720 (1986) (pointing to politicians' use of the death penalty in crime control
platforms to help "manage" as an issue and garner public support).
7. See generally Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501 (1990)
(detailing an in depth study of existence, motivation, and methodology of non-profit charitable
organizations).
8. SeeFineman, supra note 1, at 26 (urging for a more responsive and active state).
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II. MANAGEABLE UNITS
A. Universities versus the Fineman Plan
My central thesis is that there are areas where social under-
investment can be traced to the unmanageable scope of the
underlying problem-at least as presently formulated. The basic idea
is that donors and other monitors need a way to see that their money
is well spent. This requires a closed system that is comparable to
competing systems. Competition requires common baselines or
other means for making comparisons. Donors and other investors
may shy away from opportunities where they fear that they will have
no way ofjudging the performance of that which they support.
Consider, for example, the remarkable success of American
universities. Rather than adducing evidence of particular research
and intellectual accomplishments, rates of return on investments, or
simply the international flow of students and faculty, I will simply
assume that readers are willing to take the success of this industry as a
given. But what are the features that explain this success? Notable
characteristics that are not found in many other countries include a
substantial non-profit but non-public sector, a parallel set of public
competitors, important grant and scholarship programs funded by
the federal government, and a history of substantial private
fundraising (especially in the non-profit, private sector).9
Another important feature of the landscape is of course, the tax
treatment of university activities. There is a charitable deduction
available to donors and tax-exempt status for the universities
receiving these funds.1' It is difficult to imagine our system of higher
education in the absence of these tax rules, and it is perhaps too easy
to take these features for granted, but I do not dwell on the tax angle.
It is possible to think of the tax treatment as part of the funding
offered by the federal (and state) government. Indeed, a good way to
think about the tax deductions available to donors is as a kind of
matching program which informs the government as to how to spend
its resources." In any event, inasmuch as my aim here is to
understand our domestic social welfare programs and
9. See generally Douglas M. Saloway, Note, UMIFA and Model for Endowrment Investing, 22 J.C.
& U.L. 1045 (1996) (discussing university funding, comparing federal funding with growing
importance of private endowments as a source of revenue).
10. Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 501 (1999) (providing for both tax exempt status
for universities as well as authorizing a tax deduction claim for donors).
11. See Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 387, 405 (1998) (proposing a
system through which private contributions to charitable organizations would be made through
apportionment of tax payments).
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opportunities-where similar tax treatment is available-it is useful to
downplay the role of the tax system in influencing the success of the
education system.
This is obviously not the place to insist on the few variables that
might explain the success of American universities. But there is
much to be gained from the observation that universities here are in
"manageable units" from the perspective of states, private donors,
and other investors who wish to compare these potential recipients of
resources. There is competition in the sense that universities can be
compared. Potential donors, students, and granting agencies can
compare the performances of several universities. Graduates develop
loyalty to their institutions and one reason this loyalty translates into
financial support is that there is a sort of friendly, manageable
competition among universities such that a substantial number of
graduates do not like to see their own institution fall behind. I will
try to avoid belaboring the point by rushing to several conclusions.
First, we might simply say that collective action, selfishness, and other
problems that might prevent universities from obtaining support
from their graduates, state governments, and private firms are partly
overcome by the fact that these universities are sufficiently self-
contained and comparable. Second, potential donors are not so
numerous that they cannot possibly imagine their own contributions
doing some good. Finally, these donors are able to think of
themselves as doing something worthwhile even as they enjoy the
sport of competing with other universities.
Donors to a given university are able to monitor their university by
observing indicia relating to students attracted to this university as
compared with others, by observing prizes and other measures of
faculty performance, by assessing the physical plant of the university
so that impressive buildings reflect the investment of donated
resources and send signals about the values of the university, and so
forth. Universities are able to locate themselves in a kind of market
niche and appeal to students and donors in this manner. The
presence of competitors helps this process along.
Consider now the problem our governments and non-profit
enterprises face in seeking to attract funds to such causes as
supporting single-parent families and other programs that Professor
Fineman's lecture suggests.12 We might focus on subsidiary programs,
such as day care and worker training, but my argument is cleaner-
and certainly more responsive to Professor Fineman's lamentation-
12. SeeFineman, supra note 1, at 22-23 (discussing the use of subsidies).
SOCIAL PROGRAMS AND MANAGEABLE UNITS
if we remain focused on her larger subject of wealth redistribution
(reflecting what she calls interdependency) between the haves and
the child-rearing have-nots. 13 For ease of exposition I will imagine
that the Fineman Plan consists of large-scale wealth transfers to
working mothers well beyond those available through current
programs. 4 Different readers might imagine different programs, but
even without specifying any single plan we might simply imagine a
policy or program aimed at qualifying "providers." An important
feature of any such program is that it redistributes substantial
financial resources to these providers (or those in their care). To be
sure, these resources might prove an excellent investment, but in the
short run redistribution of this kind must come either through the
political process-as the recent plan put forward by Professors
Ackerman and Alstott imagines 15 -or through a process of private
contributions.
The first thing to see is that the Provider Program, as we might
think of it, could not be more different from the university model.
Recipients under the Program will be dispersed, numerous, and
mobile, or at least potentially so. The Program's goal of advancing
the society's interest in promoting equal opportunity and in making
sensible investments in its citizens seems at least as attractive as
education in terms of "selling" to donors. But, there is a serious
problem in identifying or creating manageable, comparable units.
The university example suggests not only the value of comparable
and even competing units but also the disadvantages associated with
the Program beneficiaries' characteristics. Thus, the dispersed
arrangement of recipients under the Program means that it is
difficult to attract donors with geographic loyalties; difficult or in
some sense "inefficient" to encourage donors to attach their names to
facilities that might serve these recipients because such naming
opportunities are likely to be far inferior to cash payments; and
difficult for interested donors to monitor the program they empower.
The fact that recipients are numerous means that it is difficult for
donors to see palpable results. Environmental and habitat-oriented
organizations, for example, succeed by making the case for a given
project such as acquiring acreage for park-land or taking steps to
increase the population of a threatened species. This is very much
like universities raising funds for a particular type of research, for a
13. Fineman, supra note 1, at 27 n.25.
14. Fineman, supra note 1, at 27.
15. See generally BRUCE AcKEIAN & ANN ALSTOTr, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIET (1999)
(proposing a plan that redistributes financial resources).
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new library, or even for student scholarships. In all of these cases it is
easy to see that donors might identify with the proposed project and
sense some accomplishment when they observe "results."
In contrast, I doubt that an organization which sought to raise
money for "deserving students at colleges across the country" would
attract much in the way of donations. Those who earmark their gifts
towards more manageable units enjoy several advantages. They are
likely to have some sense of control, they might compare recipient
institutions, and they might be more likely to feel that their gifts had
some impact or that they repaid some social debt. Universities, local
museums, and some churches are thus well situated in the market for
donors, but a large scale redistribution effort on behalf of working
mothers with low incomes (to take one palpable example) is perhaps
terribly situated.
B. Intermediate Charitable Solutions
I will return below to possible solutions, or ways of advancing the
Provider Program idea. However, it is useful first to think of steps that
might be taken in the direction of the program that Fineman
suggests. 6 As long as we continue to limit the discussion here to non-
profit organizations and charitable giving, most of these steps will be
familiar ones. Thus, a charity might seek funds for a school that
trained mothers eager to join or improve their position in the
workforce. Others might seek funds for a day care center or for a
health care program.
To the extent that "entrepreneurs" are able to create manageable
units to appeal to donors, some of what the Provider Program aims to
accomplish can indeed be created without any serious change. The
problem is that if the best program is one that transferred substantial
resources to a large group of beneficiaries, such as single parents
earning between $10,000 and $30,000, with few if any strings
attached, then these intermediate programs may be inefficient in the
sense that they channel resources to second best services. Money
might be raised most easily for women's shelters, vocational schools
or hospitals because these concrete projects offer donors some
satisfaction or, more interestingly, because donors can compare the
performance of such an institution against that of other institutions
of comparable size. But these types of programs may be inferior to
cash outlays that the beneficiary group can spend as it likes.
16. See generally Fineman, supra note 1, at 16 (proposing the concept of collective
responsibility).
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Efficiency minded donors, if we may think of them that way, who
agree wholeheartedly with Professor Fineman's very economic claim
that a Provider program would be an excellent social and economic
investment, 17 might be expected to think economically about their
investments. They may see the advantage of redistribution with no
strings attached-but they may fear that the impact of money
invested in an open-ended pool of needy people will be impossible to
evaluate. Such investors might wish to contribute instead to second
best options such as shelters and emergency medical care funds.
Their first choice, we might imagine, is to join in the Fineman Plan in
transferring resources to single, working parents,18 but to do so in
circumstances where this "experiment," or the selection mechanism
applied to recipients, can be monitored in order to be sure that
future resources go where they do the most good.
It bears emphasizing that I am not claiming any evidence for the
proposition that large cash outlays are the way to go. I merely begin
by wondering why so much money is raised for so many causes but
then so little for the sort of program that Professor Fineman has in
mind. 9 From there, it is a small step to the possibility that she is right
(which is to say that a substantial subset of the population would vote
her way if well informed about the problems and the available returns
from redistributive investments) 20 but that charities do not
successfully arise to take advantage of this intuition or set of
preferences.
One can barely imagine novel steps in this direction. For example,
if donors fear that some beneficiaries poorly spend transferred
resources, and that this will bring bad publicity to the program as a
whole, then donors might be encouraged to finance a kind scrip or
voucher program that transfers near-money to beneficiaries. Schools,
stores, and any number of other qualifying businesses would accept
these vouchers, placing a hurdle in the way of those who seek to use
these resources for drugs or perhaps certain luxury goods. Donors
might be more inclined to contribute if there were some record-
keeping of expenditures. This sort of voucher idea, reminiscent
perhaps of food stamp programs and some local programs through
which donors are encouraged to give such scrip (rather than cash) to
homeless persons or panhandlers, is unlikely to be terribly successful
on a large scale. Once again, a voucher program solves one likely
17. SeeFineman, supra note 1, at 22 (discussing the role of subsidy programs).
18. Fineman, supra note 1, at 26.
19. Fineman, supra note 1, at 26.
20. Fineman, supra note 1, at 26.
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concern of donors but it does little to make programs comparable.
Consider, in this regard, recent and well-publicized privately
funded programs that promise an inner city fourth grade class, or
some comparable target group, college scholarships for all members
who succeed in continuing with their education and gaining college
admission. These programs are clever in that they transfer resources
that cannot easily be misspent, and they encourage a long term
partnership among the targeted students, donors, and students'
families. In some cases, the donors work to provide counseling and
other assistance long before it is time for college. More to my point,
the target group in these cases is fixed and is a manageable unit. It is
possible to see how thirty students in a target class program benefits
over the next ten or fifteen years as compared with other classes in
the same, or neighboring schools. Additionally, the unit allows
donors to sense that they are making, or at least offering, a
meaningful contribution. If five of thirty would normally be expected
to go to college, and the program succeeds rather wildly in sending
ten additional class members to college, the cost will be that of
associated fifteen college students (and earlier services). We might
estimate this cost at $2 million dollars, which seems like a reasonable
amount for a foundation, wealthy individual, or graduating college
class to contemplate.
Without belaboring the point, I will hold this up as an example of
the best kind of modern innovation in fundraising and social
experimentation. It may turn out in five or ten years that the school
drop-out rates from these lucky, targeted classes do not differ much
from other less fortunate classes that did not attract innovative
donors. Perhaps it will develop that the students who do go to
college in this manner do poorly because they had the money
handed to them. However, it will be unusual if a college education
turns out to be a poor social (or private) investment. But the point is
that at least we might learn something from these experiments. We
will also learn something, precisely because the targeted group forms
a manageable unit that will be much studied in the near future. We
may learn that the money alone is enough, that less money and more
counseling along the way is better, that attention is more important
than money, or that teachers need to be rewarded in order to raise
the percentage of students who go to college. In comparison to a
broadly structured program that simply offers money to poor
students, the very nature of this type of program makes it more likely
that we will learn something. Moreover, donors are more likely to
feel that their marginal contributions make a difference.
Returning to Professor Fineman's concerns, it is perhaps
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unfortunate that single, working parents do not come bundled in
classrooms or similar convenient packages. But it is possible that
social entrepreneurs are missing small-scale opportunities to imitate
the class-to-college examples. Thus, a women's shelter administrator
might note that twenty of thirty women who needed the shelter in a
given period seemed to fit the model of single working parents with
young children who might thrive with a cash transfer, or annual
stipend promised for five or ten years, so long as certain conditions
were met for renewal.
III. GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS
I have suggested thus far that Professor Fineman's lamentation
raises the positive question of why some social problems do not
generate significant private or charitable efforts while others bring
out enormous energy and resources. It is conventional to lament
further and to suppose that problems of perception, selfishness, and
even racism explain the absence of apparent concern and action in
some quarters. But I have suggested that private effort may be much
more likely when donors are offered manageable units. The units
compete with one another and with the status quo in ways that permit
donors not only to feel that they have accomplished something but
also to reach some judgments as to whether their resources are well
spent. My primary aim has been to ask and answer this positive
question. It is apparent, however, that if the answer I offer
(regarding manageable units) is on the mark, then there is a third
step to be taken in the form of likely solutions to the obvious
normative question of what it is that social entrepreneurs might do to
overcome the disinclination of donors. I have devoted fewer words to
that step, suggesting only that groups of beneficiaries might be
"organized" into manageable units.
But my analysis has necessarily focused on private efforts, especially
of the non-profit kind. Professor Fineman's implicit claim, on the
other hand, is that our society should by democratic decision-making
engage in "interdependent calculations" and re-distributions.21 It is
useful, therefore, to translate the claim about manageable units into
the public sector. This is easily done and I have, of course, been
using the example of higher education for just this reason.
Why are states and cities more likely to invest in and experiment
with institutions of higher education than to invest in the sort of
program Fineman has in mind? A valuable clue is that public
21. Fineman, supra note 1, at 26-27 n.25.
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universities are not state-wide or nation-wide programs but rather are
very much sized in the manner of their private counterparts. Even
when state universities are parts of state-wide systems, there is
significant on-campus decision-making and distinct reputations and
characteristics are encouraged. McDonald's may try for
homogenization in the market for fast food, but inasmuch as state
universities do not seek itinerant repeat customers, they offer product
differentiation within their systems. More to the point, even if they
do not intend to differentiate, they benefit from offering manageable
units because graduates are more likely to feel loyal, and because
performance can more easily be assessed by taxpayers, politicians,
and consumers who will, in turn, be more likely to invest resources in
these institutions. It goes almost without saying that the competition
between public and private schools, and between public systems in
the various states, offers further advantages.
This sort of thing is much more difficult to do with redistributive
programs of the kind Fineman has in mind. If a state offers stipends
to qualifying care givers, for example, taxpayers and politicians fear
that the state will become a magnet for needy care givers.
Universities can exclude students more easily than can welfare
programs, and families that migrate to take advantage of good
schools are more likely to include valuable taxpayers than are low-
income care givers. Moreover, a state-wide program is difficult to
assess and monitor. Local governments might do better in this
regard but then of course, they face more serious problems in terms
of attracting beneficiaries.
This particular "problem" of mobility is not unlike that faced in
health insurance schemes. If employees do not move jobs, and
employers do not hire and fire, based on health care considerations,
then the employment unit works fairly well as an insurance or
pooling unit. But where mobility concerns are serious, it may actually
make sense to organize insurance schemes around a fixed group (not
unlike the once-proposed regional alliances), such as all people born
in a certain town. The town might bargain on behalf of this group in
order to secure services from health care providers. People might
move to and from the town, but the idea is to keep the bargaining
unit fixed. If Xmoves from town A to B, X continues to be part of A's
group in this scheme, and A is responsible for buying health care for
Xin town B. We might expect A to bargain with B to move Xinto Bs
group, perhaps exchanging members on a large scale basis, but
neither A nor B need do so. Presumably, enough of the original
members in group A will stay in town A so as to provide some
monitoring and democratic control over the management of the
112
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group in a direct fashion or through A's existing political system.
The same idea might be applied to other programs including the
kind Professor Fineman encourages. 22  Fifty low-income working
parents who live near one another might be lumped in a group
regardless of whether some move away or others move into the area.
But this is obviously not the place to explore the details of such
manageable units. The point is simply that most private and public
(and parallel) successes appear in manageable units. Enterprises
ranging from hospitals to universities to operas and museums all
seem to come in manageable units. Other redistributive projects
might do well to copy this pattern. Purely public projects also try to
foster comparisons and competition. Yosemite and Yellowstone
National Parks develop distinct reputations-and indeed it would not
be startling to find such national parks privatized or placed in non-
profit forms where they appeal better to private donors, but we would
expect them to remain in manageable units rather than bundled
together.
IV. CONCLUSION
Professor Fineman offers a valuable lamentation that encourages
us to think of the world we might construct around us. My own
inclination is to puzzle over the way the world is organized. We all
know many people who share the vision of more egalitarian wealth
distribution or more support for, or payments to, those who do more
than their "share" of child-rearing and the like. The question, then,
is why organizations and politicians do not materialize to tap into
these preferences or instincts. I have tried to suggest here that such
political and social entrepreneurs are more likely to succeed, and
therefore to arise, where the projects they put forth are of
manageable size. Donors will be more likely to support programs
that can be compared and monitored, and that generate a sense that
each contributor provided something worthwhile. Politicians who
respond to voters and taxpayers may have similar preferences.
It is possible that this argument about manageable units offers
some hints as to how our world might indeed be different. Political,
social, and even profit-oriented entrepreneurs might see ways to
capitalize on the manageable unit idea. But it is possible that the
problem is more formidable and that the moon is simply a more
manageable target than the ghettos.
22. Fineman, supra note 1, at 26-27 n.25.
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